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ABSTRACT:  Natural  disasters  and  deliberate,  willful  damage  to  telecommunication 
infrastructure  can result  in  a  loss  of  critical  voice and data  services.  This  loss  of  service 
hinders the ability for efficient emergency response and can cause delays leading to loss of 
life. Current mobile devices are generally tied to one network operator. When a disaster is of 
significant  impact,  that  network  operator  cannot  be  relied  upon  to  provide  service  and 
coverage levels that would normally exist. While some operators have agreements with other 
operators to share resources (such as network roaming) these agreements are contractual in 
nature  and  cannot  be  activated  quickly  in  an  emergency.  This  paper  introduces  Fourth 
Generation (4G) wireless networks. 4G networks are highly mobile and heterogeneous, which 
makes 4G networks highly resilient in times of disaster.
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1  Introduction
Natural disasters, accidents and malicious actions (herein referred to as disruptive events) can 
have  devastating  effects  on  critical  telecommunication  infrastructure.  Unfortunately, 
protecting telecommunication assets against these threats is difficult as the acts are random 
and not necessarily  directed at  the telecommunication equipment.  Fourth Generation (4G) 
Mobile Networks are currently under development and will provide greater resilience in times 
of disaster. This paper will highlight some of the advantages in disaster scenarios that can be 
obtained by the introduction of 4G networks.
The loss  of  wireless  communications  in  a  disaster  is  a  loss  of  critical  infrastructure  that 
hinders  authorities  and  aid  organisations providing  assistance  as  well  as  the  general 
population (Manoj & Baker 2007). While the affect on command and control is obvious the 
isolation felt by the populace may be difficult to quantify.
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The development and gradual introduction of 4G networks can mitigate the loss of service 
and  network  meltdown  problems  that  disruptive  events  can  have  on  traditional  mobile 
networks. A 4G network has no single network operator or provider, but rather makes use of 
any available Radio Access Network (RAN), called an Access Provider (AP). A 4G user need 
not have a preexisting relationship with an AP before being able to make use of them.
2  Current State of Mobile Communications
If  a  disruptive  event  were  to  occur  today  first  responders  (emergency  services,  aid 
organisations, etc) would likely use the P25 or APCO25 network. However, as the scope of 
the event increases the need to coordinate with agencies and services that are not part of the 
P25 network becomes apparent. In this case, the use of existing public telecommunication 
infrastructure  would  become  necessary  as  the  P25  network  has  limited  inter-networking 
capability.
The  general  public  would  also  begin  to  make  use  of  the  publicly  available  networks  as 
individuals make contact with their own social networks  contributing to network meltdown. 
These  networks  are  likely  to  be  GSM based  2/2.5G services,  CDMA, and 3G networks. 
Increasing penetration of Voice over IP (VoIP) networks may also carry such traffic out of the 
geographic area of the event.
Protocol 25 Network
The P25 network is a digital, encrypted network capable of providing voice and limited data 
services in the 12.5kHz range. This network has the advantages of being physically separate 
from the communication networks of the general public, be flexible enough to operate in both 
digital  and analog modes,  and be standardised to  allow interoperability  amongst  different 
vendors and emergency services.
Perhaps the greatest advantage for P25 is that it is rapidly deployable to a disaster site and 
totally  isolated  from  the  public  networks.  However,  as  the  size  of  the  disaster  grows 
geographically  the  network  needs  to  rely  on  an  established  (or  rapidly  deployable) 
infrastructure of repeaters and base stations. Furthermore, there is a finite number of stations 
that are possible on a given P25 RAN.
Unfortunately,  P25  relies  on  additional  infrastructure  to  provide  full  telecommunication 
functionality, ie, communication outside the immediate P25 network. As the need for rapid 
access to information, and rapid dissemination of information from a disaster site becomes 
more  and  more  pressing  the  advantages  of  being  isolated  become  a  challenge  for  P25 
networks. Furthermore, damage to fixed infrastructure repeaters could be so extensive that 
enough mobile repeaters do not exist to maintain coverage.
Furthermore,  it  is  likely that P25 users will  need to cross the network boundary onto the 
PSTN or Internet. Presently, P25 base stations can be deployed with satellite or microwave 
back haul, which can then connect with off site equipment to interface with other networks. 
However, this equipment takes time to deploy and align and maybe limited in number, or 
difficult to distribute to a particular site.
The P25 network in regards to modern telecommunication expectations lacks the ability to 
cross  networks  and  provide  geographically  diverse  communication.  Furthermore,  P25  is 
reliant on an specially deployed RAN where redundancy must be provided within the P25 
network.
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Common Public Access Networks
A  number  of  wide  area  network  technologies  are  available  for  the  general  public  with 
multiple network operators servicing the same geographic location. A brief outline of these 
technologies are:
1.  GSM
GSM  is  (globally)  the  most  widely  deployed  and  adopted  mobile  voice  technology.  In 
Australia  a  number  of  GSM  networks  exist  with  coverage  of  most  populated  regions. 
Additionally, of the available technologies, GSM has the highest number of subscribers.
A GSM network is made up of cells, with each cell servicing a given geographic area. It is 
possible (and a common deployment practice in densely populated areas) for multiple cells of 
the  same  network  operator  to  cover  the  same  geographic  area,  but  be  differentiated  by 
frequency.  Unfortunately,  as  tower  space  is  a  premium multiple  cells  may  be  physically 
located at the same site. This increases available capacity, but does not provide resilience in 
the case of physical damage of that site.
2.  CDMA
The CDMA network in Australia operates in a similar fashion to the GSM network however 
its  deployment  is  considerably  less.  Furthermore,  Australia's  largest  CDMA  network 
(operated by Telstra) is being decommissioned and replaced with the NextG network.
3.  UMTS and NextG Networks
Wideband  CDMA (W-CDMA) or  Universal  Mobile  Telecommunication  System (UMTS) 
networks, aka 3G, are rapidly replacing the existing GSM and CDMA networks. The Telstra 
NextG  network  is  a  UMTS  network  operating  at  850Mhz,  while  other  3G  offerings  in 
Australia operate at the typical 3G frequency band of 2100Mhz. UMTS was developed by the 
Third  Generation  Partnership  Project  (3GPP) and extends  the  GSM standard  to  meet  the 
requirements of the ITU's IMT-2000 network. As UMTS is an extension of GSM, the same 
concept of cells exists as in GSM.
4.  Wireless Voice over IP (WVoIP)
Due to the increasing number of 802.11 Wireless LAN (WLAN) hot spots and an increase in 
the number of mobile handsets providing both GSM/3G and 802.11 radios as standard, the 
use of Wireless Voice over IP (WVoIP) is becoming a cost effective alternative to traditional 
mobile  voice calls.  At present,  WLANs are  not  deployed with the intention  of  providing 
global, carrier grade access but due to the low hardware cost, and simple setup (compared to 
traditional technologies) the number of available access points can easily blanket most CBD 
locations.
Vulnerabilities of Current Mobile Technologies
All of the above mobile technologies are vulnerable to some degree of denial of service due to 
disruptive events. These disruptive events can impact communication systems in a number of 
different ways:
1.  Destruction of Infrastructure
The  most  obvious  disruptive  event  is  the  accidental  (man  made  or  natural)  or  willful 
destruction of deployed telecommunication infrastructure. An example of this was in the 9/11 
terrorist  attacks  on the World Trade  Center  where a  large portion  of  the GSM switching 
equipment servicing lower Manhattan was located in the twin towers. The terrorist attack had 
the,  supposedly,  unexpected  impact  of  causing  a  mass  outage  of  mobile  communication 
systems. Another extreme situation may be the physical destruction, or reduced functionality 
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of the an extremely critical piece of infrastructure such as the GSM Home Location  Register 
(HLR).
2.  Radio Interference
Interference  of  the  radio  spectrum  can  impact  on  mobile  communication.  While  this 
interference is unlikely to be caused by a destructive event, it is worth considering loss of 
service in any form as a potential life threatening situation. For example,  during the 2006 
Australian  Tennis  Open  in  Melbourne,  IBM  was  conducting  an  RFID  demonstration. 
However, this demonstration interfered with Vodaphone's GSM network affecting customers 
of that network in the vicinity of the demonstration (Woodhead 2007). There was a potential 
tragedy in this case if someone required the ability to contact emergency services.
3.  Unmaintainable Infrastructure
While a disruptive event may not damage infrastructure directly, the consequence of an event 
may cause the loss of a critical dependency (such as fuel or gas) or unmaintainable due to lack 
of physical  access due to an event.  A quantity  of communication equipment  survived the 
initial impact of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, but as generators ran out of fuel and with 
no physical access to transport additional fuel, service was eventually lost.
4.  Network isolation and Upstream Faults
The core of most voice networks is shared amongst a number of different types of traffic. 
Furthermore, as network operators use IP transit in the core for voice traffic, routing problems 
can affect the network in different ways. This can affect WvoIP services more commonly as 
these are typically deployed over consumer grade broadband connections. For example, last 
year a hardware failure at a Sydney data centre affected VoIP customers in  at least three 
states and two service providers (Sweeney 2006).
5.  Lack of Capacity
Another problem faced by communication networks, especially during a disaster, is lack of 
capacity.  This lack of capacity is commonly referred to as “network meltdown”. Network 
meltdown occurs when the sheer volume of traffic fair exceeds the available capacity. The 
problem is further compounded as, in GSM for example, considerably less capacity exists for 
establishing  a  call  than  exists  for  delivery.  So  while  a  cell  may  have  spare  capacity  for 
carrying established calls, the Paging and Access Granting Channel (PAGCH) may become 
overwhelmed with the volume of users trying to establish new calls.
While emergency services can be issued with special SIM cards and handsets which can cause 
the Base Transceiver Station (BTS) to give priority to them when issuing Transport Channels 
(TCH), the PAGCH cannot be prioritised which can lead to life threatening delays.
3  Research Problem
Mobile networks, and to a lesser extent fixed line networks, are vulnerable to a number of 
possible  disruptive events.  It  would be theoretically  impossible  to build  a network that  is 
protected from all the above mentioned points of failure as the lowest common denominator, 
physical destruction of infrastructure cannot be prevented.
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What is needed is a mobile telecommunications  system that is resilient in the face of the 
different  types  of vulnerability.  Such a  network would be able  to  withstand a  reasonable 
degree  of  physical  damage, 
interference,  extended  periods  of 
unmaintained  operation,  network 
splits  or  routing  failures,  and  rapid 
explosion in demand.
4  4G Networks
4G  networks  are  designed  to  allow 
ease  of  mobility  between  network 
providers  and  technologies.  The 
intention  was  to  reduce  the  costs  to 
consumers  and  provider  greater 
capacity  and  network  heterogeneity. 
However, a side affect of this design 
is  increased  resilience  to  failure  and 
effective  redundancy  without  extra 
cost.
What is a 4G Network
Fourth  Generation  (4G)  mobile 
networks  (Ohmori  et  al.  2000),  or 
Beyond  3G  (Steer  2007)  networks 
will be extremely fast (upto 100Mbit 
in  motion  and 1Gbit  while  stationary)  packet  switched networks  providing  end-to-end IP 
connectivity via any available wireless provider (Hui & Yeung 2003, Varshney & Jain 2001). 
The network will  utilise  Internet standard Voice over IP (VoIP) protocols to provide rich 
multimedia telephony services, seamless mobility between networks, and give access to an 
unlimited  number  of  Providers.  Users  will  no  longer  have  a  relationship  with  a  single 
monolithic provider, but maintain a relationship with a Biller or Agent which enables them 
access to any provider in the 4G world (Kim & Prasad 2006). As show in Figure 1 a 4G 
network can utilise many different RAN's, where commonly multiple RAN's service the same 
geographic region, giving the quality of redundancy.
Resilient Networks
As 4G networks were designed to fully realise the benefits of heterogeneous networks the 
ability to be resilient in the face of disruptive events is apparent. This resilience is possible 
due to the high level of mobility afforded by 4G Networks.
However, the resilient nature of 4G networks is based on the assumption that some radio 
network remains after a disruptive event. The rationale behind this assumption is that it would 
appear unlikely for the same event to affect all providers. The obvious exception to this would 
be large scale environmental  events that would likely affect all providers in some way. A 
more detailed analysis of how 4G networks and heterogeneity can provide greater resilience 
will be discussed in the following section.
In the  theoretical  event  that  all  infrastructure  from all  providers  is  rendered  unusable  for 
whatever reason, a new RAN can be rapidly deployed through the use of mobile base stations 
which, if 4G aware, will become accessible to all 4G handsets. This way, communications is 
restored to the greatest number of users in the shortest period of time.
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Figure 1. Typical 4G Network 
5  Analysis
The benefits  of the heterogeneous model in 4G networks can mitigate against  the various 
disruptive events described earlier. Unfortunately, 4G networks are still in the design phases 
and are not in available right now. The standardisation process has begun and some small 
research networks exist in Beijing and Tokyo. The usefulness of 4G networks in the various 
disruptive scenarios described earlier is discussed below:
1.  Destruction of Infrastructure
As  most  physical  damage  is  localised  the  likelihood  of  the  event  affecting  all  network 
operators in the area serviced by the affected infrastructure is small. The alternative situation 
is wide spread events such as flooding and cyclones where wide geographic areas are all 
impacted with the same event. Even in these extreme cases the likelihood that some RAN 
survives over another is plausible. Not all areas will experience flooding to the same depth 
and not all areas affected by a cyclone would have received the same destructive wind speeds.
2.  Radio Interference
Radio frequency interference can occur for a number reasons, both accidental and intentional, 
for natural or man made causes. The advantage of 4G networks is that the different RAN's 
operate at different frequencies. This means that while one network, say 802.11 WLANs, may 
become inoperable, GSM and UMTS may be unaffected by the interference and continue to 
provide service.
3.  Unmaintainable Infrastructure
Unfortunately  4G  networks  may  not  provide  an  effective  solution  for  unmaintainable 
infrastructure as typically events of this nature affect very large geographic areas as described 
earlier.  Eventually,  after a lengthy unmaintained period all RANs will fail.  However, it  is 
possible  that  each individual  RAN may remain in operation for different  lengths of time. 
Therefore, the 4G approach will provide availability for the longest possible period of time, 
albeit with dwindling capacity.
In this case, the deployment of emergency mobile equipment to form a new RAN is likely to 
offer the simplest solution as infrastructure could be deployed in areas where maintenance is 
possible or where existing infrastructure is operational but lacks a critical piece of equipment 
elsewhere  in  the  network.  An  example  of  this  is  GSM  base  stations  that  may  still  be 
operational but the Base Station Controller (BSC) has been damaged. In this situation, it may 
be simple enough to deploy a new BSC and reactive the existing undamaged BTS's.
4.  Network Isolation and Upstream Faults
Infrastructure that has become unusable due to a network isolation or a fault with an upstream 
provider will also benefit from the 4G approach. While it is likely that some cell sites may 
share a common medium for back haul, different network operators are unlikely to use the 
same backbone providers. Specifically, large national telecommunication carriers will have 
built their own back haul networks for their exclusive use. In this case a loss of back haul for 
Provider A is not going to impact Provider B's ability to provide service. 
The loss of back haul however becomes more apparent  when considering 802.11 WLAN 
RANs which may be connected to the Internet through a service provider that  wholesales 
back  haul  from  a  national  telecommunications  carrier.  In  this  case,  mobile  service  and 
Internet  connectivity  will  be  affected,  rendering  both  the  802.11  networks  and  the 
GSM/UMTS network unavailable.  However,  again  the  outage  should be  localised  to  one 
particular carrier with others still being able to provide service.
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5.  Insufficient Capacity
Handling explosive demand in network resources is better handled by 4G networks which by 
design share the demand across a greater number of access points and frequency space than 
what could be possible if locked to one provider. Furthermore, as 4G networks are highly 
mobile  and  heterogeneous  it  is  easier  to  expand  capacity  as  any  additional  RAN  will 
automatically become part of the 4G network and be accessible to users.
6  Conclusions
Natural disasters, accidents,  and willful damage to telecommunication infrastructure or the 
unintended collateral damage to infrastructure from an act against a third party can disrupt 
critical mobile telecommunication services. Furthermore, building resiliency and redundancy 
into isolated mobile networks is expensive and time consuming.  4G networks will provide 
technology agnosticism and provider independence, which will mitigate against outages or 
disruptions in any one technology or operator.
The  impact  of  physical  destruction,  radio  interference,  difficulties  in  maintaining 
infrastructure,  problems with upstream service  providers,  and insufficient  capacity  can be 
mostly addressed by the use of 4G networks. However, as shown in the analysis, prolonged 
periods without maintenance over a large geographic area cannot be routed around and the 4G 
network  will  become  unavailable.  The  benefit  being  though,  that  availability  will  be 
maintained longer than that of independent operators.
A challenge that is noted is what occurs when a provider, especially one with a large number 
of users, goes offline and potentially, all those users migrate to a smaller providers network. 
In this case the loss of a large RAN will cause congestion on the smaller  RAN's and the 
difficulties  of  insufficient  capacity  will  continue  to  exist.  But  this  can  be  mitigated  by 
deploying emergency mobile equipment that most large providers keep in reserve for these 
events.
The  future  of  4G  network  promises  strong  reliability  through  increased  redundancy  and 
resiliency.  While  unfortunately these networks are  not  actively  being deployed yet as the 
standardisation process is just beginning, their eventual deployment will provide increased 
public safety as mobile communications will be more available. Furthermore, the benefits to 
emergency services will also further enhance public safety.
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